Values and rights, rule of law, security

Article 42.7 of TEU is the current mutual defense clause:

”If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.”

This obligation of mutual defense is binding on all EU countries. However, it does not affect the neutrality of certain EU countries and is consistent with the commitments of EU countries that are NATO members.

Given public support, the EU should amend the legislation for its military policy.

The mutual defense clause (Article 42.7 of TEU) has five potential failings:

1) “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory…”

It may be too late to help when the Member State has already been attacked. Think of Georgia and Crimea. Modern wars can be fast and furious. The game is over before the EU wakes up. On the other hand, modern wars can be slow and devious. Think of Donbas and Belarus. Hybrid wars, cyber-attacks and assassinations of opposition leaders do not necessarily take place as “armed aggression” on the “territory” of a Member State.

2) “Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance…”

Member States are obliged, but the EU institutions are not. What “shall” happen, and when? The obligation "towards it" sounds vague and delayed. First aid and good advice may not be enough.

3) “… by all the means in their power”

The nuclear powers may think twice if this obliges, and even other Member States might hesitate.

To be continued:

4) “This shall not prejudice the specific character of security and defence policy of certain Member States…”

The non-NATO members of the EU are free to ignore mutual defense obligations.

5) “Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with… (NATO)”

The EU and NATO members may end up in a conflict of interest if Greece and Turkey fight for Cyprus, etc.

The mutual defense clause – Article 42.7 of TEU – should be pro-active and pre-emptive. It should also be centralized and concretized at the EU level. What do these words mean?

”Pro-active” means that the EU institutions prepare for war before it takes place. The EU institutions should not wait until a Member States becomes ”a victim of armed aggression on its territory”. The mutual defense arrangements should be built up in advance. The EU should act already in the time of peace.

”Pre-emptive” means that the mutual defense arrangements would make the attack (or other aggression) difficult, while strengthening and improving the defensive capabilities. The pre-emptive measures by the EU could include military intelligence, tripwire troops, training, war games, lend-and-lease equipment, etc.

To be continued:

”Concrete” means that the defense arrangements are defined in terms of men, money and machines. The procedures, timelines and logistics for aid and assistance must have been agreed on and tested in practice. The arrangements should also allow for flexibility, should the aggression deviate from the basic scenarios.

”Centralized” means the EU institutions have men, money and machines available for aid and assistance. This would require EU-owned military assets like Galileo or Copernicus satellites, EU defense funds, and EU arms depots. It would also call for personnel who manage logistics and operate military assets.

In short, the EU should be ready, willing and able to support the Member State in its war efforts on request.

European Defense Union (EDU) is the legislative train for a common defense policy, command and control structures and military capabilities in the EU.

”The possibility of a common defence policy is enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty's Article 42. In his 2016 State of the Union speech, Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker proposed a number of initiatives in defence, including the creation of a European Defence Fund (EDF), a single headquarters for operations, the implementation of permanent structured cooperation and a move towards common military assets. He insisted on full complementarity with NATO.”

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-europe-as-a-stronger-global-actor/file-european-defence-union

The EU needs to finance its defense and deterrent from:

1) EU defense budget.
2) EU defense funds.

The EU defense budget could be funded in three ways:

1a) The EU might enforce the 2% NATO target for military spending by collecting the shortcomings to its own defense budget. For example, if a Member States spends 1.5% of GDP on defense, it must transfer the remaining 0.5% to the EU defense budget.

1b) The EU could agree on how to allocate defense spending between the centrally administered EU defense budget and national defense budgets.

1c) The EU could include defense as part of its budget, allocating funds from new own resources (e.g. carbon tax and emission trading).

The EU defense funds for research, development and acquisition of military assets should be gradually increased to create innovative military capabilities.

The EU should construct arms depots for EU-owned or jointly-purchased military assets.

The EU already has agencies to operate satellites that can provide military intelligence information. This concept could be expanded to prepare for a war, attack, aggression or other crises situations in the EU Member States.

The storage caves for arms, ammunition, fuel, medical equipment, etc. could be located in the non-NATO members of the EU. The central arms depot might be located in Austria, while the front-line countries of Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, and Finland or Sweden could host decentralized arsenal.

NATO members have military bases on their territory, including Geilenkirchen Air Base in Germany and Pápa Air Base in Hungary, or Olavsvern Submarine Base in Norway.

The EU institutions and agencies cannot be ready, willing and able to support any Member State in defense until they have means to do so, including EU arms depots.

The EU will eventually need also Armed forces: Army, Navy and Air Force.

The EU Army should be built step-by-step over time:

- Tripwire Troops.
- European Legion.
- The EU 28th Army.

Instead of repeating past mistakes, the EU should directly hire professional soldiers on contracts.

Starting with Tripwire Troops (1,500 men), the EU could recruit men from national Special Forces on 3 x 5 years contracts. The Tripwire Troops would train in different EU countries and overseas territories. Their main job would be to “show the EU flag” in a Member State facing armed aggression.

The next step would be to establish the European Legion (5,000 men). It could operate overseas, based on the UN or EU mandates for peace keeping or other justified causes.

Finally, the EU 28th Army might be formed for the European Federation.

The EU Air Force should also be built step-by-step over time:

- NATO air-policing in Baltics and Balkans.
- EU/NATO air support operations overseas.
- The EU Air Force.

NATO fighter jets already patrol in the Baltic airspace. Air-policing could be extended to Balkans and other EU/NATO members with no Air Force or old and outdated fighter jets. There could also be other cost-effective solutions for countries to replace their fleets, such as leasing. Anyway, the fighter jet types in the EU will be reduced (to F-35, Eurofighter, Rafale, and JAS 39 Gripen).

The next step would be to expand expensive fleet types. In addition to the NATO surveillance aircraft (Boeing E-3A AWACS) and heavy airlift capacity (C-17s and Antonovs), the EU/NATO countries could jointly purchase air-tankers, combat drones and electronic warfare planes (for training, war games and overseas operations), and develop 6th generation multi-role fighters, etc.

Finally, the EU Air Force might be formed for the European

The EU Navy should not be built up slowly over time. The project should start immediately:

- Arleigh Burke or Zumwalt-class destroyers for Air / Ballistic Missile Defense, etc.
- Aircraft and helicopter carriers for “showing the EU flag”.
- Nuclear submarines for credible deterrent.

Naval Forces are something that the EU inland countries (Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) lack. Even other EU members have limited Maritime Forces.

The EU Navy would serve several purposes: trade and foreign policy, international operations, defense and deterrent. The EU Navy could be used for protecting the sea-lanes, deterring piracy, showing the EU flag in the seven seas of the world, showing solidarity and support for the EU members facing armed aggression, and as an ultimate nuclear deterrent.

The EU Navy should be the first branch of the armed forces for the European Federation.

EU:n valtamerilaivaston rakentamista motivoi enemmän voiman näyttö kuin käyttö. Mutta alusten pitäisi silti selviytyä uusista uhkista.

Eri alustoilta laukaistavat häivepintamaaliohjukset (Gabriel V tai JSM) sekä ballistiset (DF-26B tai DF-21D) ja hypersooniset (BrahMos-II tai 3M22 Zircon) merimaaliohjukset uhkaavat pinta-aluksia. Raidetykit ja energia-aseet voivat tulevaisuudessa toimia vasta-aseina. Toisaalta torpedot ja autonomiset alukset muuttavat tilannekuvaa.

USAn Arleigh Burke -hävittäjät toimivat alustoina Aegis-ilmapuolustusjärjestelmille. Zumwalt-luokka hakee yhä tehtäväänsä: maihinnousutukialuksen tykkien ammukset (> 100 km) tulivat liian kalliiksi. Mutta alus soveltuu alustaksi myös hypersoonisille merimaali- ja ilmatorjuntaohjuksille. Viimeisimmissä inkarnaatioissa Zumwalt-hävittäjiä on kaavailtu komentoalukseksi tiedustelulennokeille ja maamaaliohjuksille.

Jos EU rakentaa valtamerilaivaston, millaisia aluksia jäsenvaltiot tarvitsevat rannikoilleen ja ”sisämerilleen”?

As a reality check, let us see what the EU is actually doing to improve its military capabilities.

The 1st annual work program of the European Defense Fund in 2021 launched 23 calls for proposals.

- Preparation of large-scale and complex defense platforms and systems (€700M for the next generation fighter systems, ground vehicles fleet, digital and modular ships, and ballistic missile defense).
- Critical technologies to enhance the performance and resilience of defense equipment (€100M for AI and cloud for military operations, semiconductors for infrared and radiofrequency components).

- Synergies with civilian EU policies and programs for space (€50M), medical response (€70M), and digital and cyber capabilities (€100M).

- Disruptive technologies and open calls for SMEs (€120M for game-changing innovations in quantum technologies, additive manufacturing, and over-the-horizon radar).

Interesting choices for the EU “full-spectrum superiority”.

The EDF’s precursor programme resulted in 2 awards and support for 26 new projects in 2020.

1) Eurodrone: A medium-altitude and long-endurance drone (together with other selected projects in support of payload for tactical drones, swarm of drones, sensors, low observable tactical systems).

2) The European Secure Software Radio: A European standardisation for communication technologies (together with other projects selected in support of secure and resilient communication, with the use of quantum key distribution, optical point to point communication between military platforms and solutions for tactical networks.

The 26 projects selected for funding focus on

- Surveillance capacities (both space-based and maritime capacities).
- Resilience (Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear detection, Counter-Unmanned Air System).
- High-end capabilities (precision-strike, ground combat, air combat).

The EU funding is mainly for research and development, rather than acquisitions.

PESCO is a framework for 25 EU members to jointly create defense capabilities for their national and multinational missions.

The current 46 PESCO projects cover training, land, sea, air, cyber and joint enablers, including:

- Joint EU intelligence school (MENSA).
- EU network of diving centers (SCUBA).
- Helicopter hot and high training (HELISKI).
- Deployable military disaster relief capability package (DIAPERS).
- Deployable modular underwater intervention capability package (PAUKKULIIVI).
- Airborne electronic attack (SALAMA).
- Geo-meteorological and oceanographic support coordination element (SUMUTUS).
- Strategic command and control (C2) system for CSDP missions and operations (EUMILCOM). (αβ-SOUP-1)
- One deployable special operations forces (SOF) tactical command and control (C2) command post (CP) for small joint operations (SJO) – (SOCC) for SJO. (DELTA-SOUP-2)

One PESCO project – EU training mission competence center – has been officially closed, as of Friday, 13th of Aug.

PESCO projects aim at coherent capabilities in the EU defense, rather than excellence, dominance or superiority. The level of ambition could be higher in some projects.

If the capabilities for defense and deterrence must go beyond “mud-hut shooting” for missions and operations in Africa, the EU nations should look at what the adversaries are doing.

Russia has recently unveiled 6 new strategic weapons:

1) Sarmat – an intercontinental ballistic missile.
2) Avantgard – a hypersonic glide vehicle to be carried by an intercontinental missile.
3) Kinzhal – a hypersonic air-to-surface missile.
4) Burevestnik – nuclear-powered cruise missile.
5) Poseidon – an intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo.
6) Peresvet – a high-energy laser weapon.

Arms race is a combat sport.

In the new world disorder, the traditional methods of deterrence have become less effective.

The last deterrent – nuclear MADness – does not necessarily deter suicidal, psychotic or ideologically blinded opponents in pariah states, terrorist caliphates or regional nuclear arms races.

Nuclear deterrence has also become almost anachronistic in the age of disinformation. An atomic bomb is being replaced by the information bomb. In information warfare, the first strike of misinformation, propaganda and kompromat drops a bombshell on the political landscape.

The second-strike capability is no longer sufficient. Dreadnought is not enough.

Dr. Strangelove must go back to his WarGames. The EU needs new deterrents.

Deterrents dissuade an adversary from taking aggressive action by persuasively demonstrating that the costs would outweigh the potential gains.

When the adversary operates below the threshold that would trigger an armed response – e.g. in hybrid warfare – the traditional deterrents are less effective.

Learning the methods leads to counter-measures.

- Military intelligence (vs counter-intelligence).
- Cyber-attacks and use of electromagnetic spectrum.
- Information and psychological warfare.
- Trade wars and legal battles (lawfare).
- Gunboat diplomacy and proxy wars.
- Special operations and prompt precision strikes.
- CBRN.

The EU needs to create common and credible deterrents to dissuade new adversaries and novel types of aggression.

Why should the EU focus on deterrence and the Member States on territorial defense – and letting the US, UN and NATO do the missions impossible?

A short answer: It has been difficult to win wars in faraway countries, like Vietnam or Afghanistan, as the US and Soviet Union learnt the hard way. And even if you win the war, you still lose the peace. In Libya, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan (again)… Exporting western values to the East or Middle East has not been a successful trade.

The expeditionary armies or EU battlegroups should not be the priority of the European Defense Union.

Al-Qaidan WTC-iskun 20-vuotisvuonna Afganistanin risupartaluolamiehet perustivat Talibanistanin.

EU ihmettelee. Pelastus- ja evakuointitoimet ovat hajallaan kuin varpusparvi haukan hyökättyä. Kuka pelkää mustapartaista miestä? Pakokauhu kalvaa ja kasvaa. Talipäät katkovat päät ja kädet. Humanitaarinen katastrofi odottaa kulman takana. Pakolaisaalto vyöryy Pakistaniin ja Iraniin. Kalifaatti tai islamistinen emiraatti palauttaa Afganistanin kivi(tys)kauteen. Al-Qaida nousee.

EU vitkastelee. Nopean toiminnan joukot hidastelevat. Delegaatiot delegoivat. Tiedustelu tiedustelee tietämättömyyttään. Mitä tehdä?

- EU:n siviilipuolustukselle operatiivinen valmius evakuoida EU-kansalaisia maailmanlaajuisesti.
- EU:n ulkosuhdehallinnolle massiivisia ulkomaan delegaatioita, pakolaisleirejä ja sotilastukikohtia.
- EU:n sotilastiedustelulle ja turvallisuushenkilöstölle terävämmät partaveitset.

EU:n satu loppuu, jos se käyttäytyy kuin eunukki ja 27 kääpiötä.

The European Defense Union should be built on a firm ground.

The ground forces are the backbone of defense. Defense, in turn, is the core task of the government. If you do not have enough boots on the ground, your government can be changed out of the voting booths. A country always has an Army: if it is not yours, then it is the one of your enemy.

Territorial armies serve as a backstop, protecting territorial integrity, safeguarding the living conditions of the residents, and shielding the constitutional law and order, as well as the values and interests of the state. Their main mission is to defend the state against external threats.

The European Defense Union must be built from the ground.

The EU countries should be ready, willing and able to defend themselves. With a little help from the EU institutions and agencies, they could also do so successfully.

How could the EU help? A vocal condemnation or a robust letter may not be enough. The help must be 1) men, 2) money and 3) machines.

1) The EU needs tripwire troops: Hired from the special forces of all Member States, they would train in the EU and overseas territories, with the main mission to move and deter attack in any Member State.
2) The EU needs bigger defense funds and other financial means for defense: EU budget allocations, off-budget facilities, European Peace Facility (war chest), and Member States’ defense budget/deficit contributions for centralized defense spending.
3) The EU needs EU-owned and jointly-purchased military assets for the EU arms depots. Finally, the EU needs a plan to consolidate the defense sector.

The EU mutual defense clause must become concrete in terms of men, money and machines.

How would Article 42.7 of NEU (for New EU) look like?

“On the request of any EU Member State, the EU institutions and agencies are obliged to aid and assist it by military troops, war machines and monetary means, in accordance with Article 51 of European Defense Union.”

The request could be based on military training, war games, or anticipation of armed aggression. The EU institutions and agencies should be able to act swiftly, based on pre-prepared agreements and various scenarios for aid and assistance, with the troop transport and lend-and-lease logistics pre-set and practiced. The details of men, money and machines to be delivered would be specified in Article 51 of EDU (arms depots, means of air, sea and land transport, and destinations/locations, as well as deadlines, timelines and allocations of materiel).

The EU’s centralized defense clause would thereby be concretized.

The centralized and concretized defense clause for the EU institutions and agencies would complement the mutual defense clauses that oblige the EU and NATO members.

It would ensure that any EU Member State has access to men, money and machines for effective defense.

- The EU “Tripwire Troops” would move and operate in the command of the host nation.
- The EU “War Chest” would wire cash, loans, guarantees and other financial aid to cover costs.
- The EU “Arms Depots” would transport arms, ammunition, vehicles and other supplies to support defense.

The EU Tripwire Troops would deter any attack until they start incurring casualties, which alarm the allies and trigger the mutual defense clauses. The costs and damage of a war would be compensated by the EU financial aid. The EU-owned or jointly-purchased military assets and other supplies would strengthen the victim's arsenal.

Eventually, the EU/NATO mutual defense clauses would kick in, with other Member States joining in the war.

Alueellinen puolustus on kunkin jäsenvaltion velvollisuus.

Sitä tukemaan ja tehostamaan tarvitaan keskitetty ja konkreettinen puolustusklausuuli Euroopan puolustusunionille (EU-instituutioille ja -erillisvirastoille). Jäsenmaan pyynnöstä EU:n toimittaa maalle ”rahaa, rautaa ja rauhanturvaajia” ulkoisen uhan, yhteisharjoitusten tai kertausharjoitusten varalta:

1) EU:lle sotakassa. Jos EU:n budjettista ei voi allokoida varoja varusteluun tai sotatoimiin, EU:n puolustusrahastoja täytyy täydentää. T&K- ja hankintarahastojen oheen operaatio- ja kriisirahasto.

2) EU:lle asevarasto. Logistiikkayksikön vastuulle etenkin kalliit maa-, ilma- ja merivoimien aseet. Unionin navigointi- ja tiedustelusatelliittien lisäksi EU:n omistamat tai yhteisesti hankitut asejärjestelmät tarvittaessa uhatun jäsenmaan käyttöön ja komentoon.

3) EU:lle ”ansalankayksikkö”. Kansallisista erikoisjoukoista palkattu sopimussotilasjoukko, joka toimii ja harjoittee EU:n alueella isäntämaan johdolla ja pyynnöstä.

Does Europe need the EU Army? Or do European armies need the EU?

In my mind, for defense, the European armies need the EU more than Europe needs the EU Army. Decentralized defense by national armed forces should be sufficient for the moment – if adequately supported by the EU institutions and agencies:

- The EU satellites (Galileo, Sentinel, etc.) to support the European armies as “Space Force”, providing information – navigation, locations, communication, weather conditions, etc.

- The EU/NATO air-policing operations to be expanded from the Baltic to Balkan countries. The jointly-purchased aircrafts (like the NATO strategic airlift capacity, AWACS, air tankers, electronic warfare aircraft, combat drones) to support any EU/NATO air forces.

- The “EU Navy” to lend or lease expensive EU-owned destroyers, submarines, and aircraft or helicopter carriers for Member States for training, joint-exercises, war games, etc.

The EU needs a center for military logistics and procurement.

Tasapainoinen puolustusunioni seisoo kahden jalan varassa: pelotteen ja puolustuksen. Työnjako EU-instanssien ja EU-jäsenmaiden välillä saisi noudattaa tätä vastuun ja toimivallan kahtiajakoa: EU:lle pelote, EU:n jäsenmaille puolustus.

Pelote, pidäke tai deterrenssi rakentaa rauhaa uskottavan (ydin)asevoiman varaan. Se pienentää sodan todennäköisyyttä. Rauha jatkuu, kun potentiaalinen vihollinen pelkää kostoiskun vaikutusta tai epäilee puolustajan pystyvän kiistämään hyökkääjän edun, ylivoiman, herruuden tai tavoitteiden saavuttamisen. Pelote on luonteeltaan passiivinen ja (vasta)hyökkäyksellinen.

Puolustus, torjunta ja viivytys perustuu sotatoimiin. Se pyrkii (torjunta)voittoon maksimoimalla vihollisen tappiot optimoimalla omat uhraukset. Sota päättyy, kun sitä ei enää kannata jatkaa. Viivytys on aktiivista puolustustaistelua.

Pelotteen ja puolustuksen erilaisen luonteen takia ne soisi erotettavan subsidiariteettiperiaatteen mukaisesti yhtäältä EU:lle ja toisaalta jäsenvaltioille.

Pelotteen ABC on nykyisin CBRN.

- Atomiaseet luovat ydinpelotteen. Pieni valtio torjuu isonkin uhan omilla ydinaseillaan kuten Israel tai Pohjois-Korea. Pienet maat voivat myös kyyristyä suuren maan (USA) ydinsateenvarjon alle. Tai ne voivat sopia ydinpelotteen jakamisesta ottamalle omalle maalleen liittolaisen ydinaseita kuten EU:n NATO-jäsenet.

- Radiologiset aseet viittaavat ”likaisiin pommeihin”, jotka levittävät radioaktiivista säteilyä saastuttamaan ympäristöä (ilman ydinräjähdystä). Terroristien käsissä sellainen joukkotuhoase olisi paha pelote.

- Biologisia aseita ovat bakteerit, virukset ja eloperäiset myrkyt (esim. botuliini).

- Kemiallisia aseita ovat taistelukaasut, savut ja sytytysaineet.

Joukkotuhoaseiden leviämisen rajoittamiseksi on parempi, että EU kontrolloi keskitetysti pelotetta, ettei jokaisen jäsenmaan tarvitse luoda omaa pidäkettään.

Puolustuksellinen pelotteen pidäke saattaa silti nousta kynnyskysymykseksi tutkakatveeseen.

Oletetaan täysin kuvitteellisesti, että

- Porin prikaatin suojelujoukot harjoittelisivat taisteluaineiden (kuten sariinin ja sinappikaasun) käyttöä kemiallisen sodankäynnin varalta;
- VERIFIN tukisi kemiallisen aseen kieltosopimuksen valvontaa kehittämällä tutkimusmenetelmiä kemiallisille taisteluaineille;
- Ekokem tuhoaisi Syyriasta siirrettyä kemiallisten aseiden jätettä;
- Helsingissä toimisi kemikaaliturvallisuutta valvova Euroopan kemikaalivirasto;
- Helsingin yliopistossa toimisi maailman suurimpiin kuuluva radiokemian instituutti.
- Jne.

Millaisten joukkotuhoaseiden leviämisen vastaisia keinoja pieni maa kehittäisi, jos se ei halua tutkia Wuhanin nuhan alkuperää tai virusmutaatioiden kiihdyttämistä laboratorioissa rokotteiden kehittämiseksi?

The European Defense Union has 3 obvious problems:

1) Political decision-making is slow at the EU level.
2) Defensive capabilities are limited in many Member States of the EU.
3) The EU cannot project power globally (as a common and credible deterrent).

The solutions are not necessarily too difficult.

In minor operations, the EU can delegate decision-making to an individual Member State, or a coalition of ready, willing and able countries. This is what happened in the evacuation in Afghanistan. The EU/NATO requested assistance from the Member States, which were able to make decisions fast and act swiftly.

Second, the defensive capabilities of a threatened Member State can be reinforced by men, money and machines from the EU. On its request, the EU should send EU tripwire troops, transfer funds, and provide access to satellite information and lend-and-lease materiel from EU arms depots (to be set up).

Finally, the EU should start building a common and credible deterrence.

AUKUS news in September.

While the joint communication on the European strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region is being published today (16 Sept 2021), Australia announces that the deal is dead for the USD 90 billion project for 12 French-designed Attack-class submarines – in order to acquire 8 nuclear submarines as part of historic partnership with US and UK (called AUKUS) to counter threats in the Indo-Pacific.

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-16/australia-nuclear-submarine-partnership-us-uk/100465814

The EU Navy obviously needs a fleet of nuclear submarines. The European strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region cannot be implemented in the form of rowing boats. Japan and South-Korea are undoubtedly speeding up their programs for nuclear-powered submarines, along with China, India and other regional powers.

A fleet of 30 nuclear submarines might suffice for the EU Member States by 2050. Even 3 would be a good start for now.

Quote : "Instead of repeating past mistakes, the EU should directly hire professional soldiers on contracts."

I agree with you on this one. Because it it passes many obstacles (laws). Wonder if the french foreign legion could be expanded and Europeanized?

Want to emphasize that what ever we do, it is meaningless to think USA out of it. We are too much alike to split up. This is also why the rivalry is so much higer and so much more hidden. You have to smile to your rival at the party. We might be rivals but when it comes to trouble, we are there for each other.

And this is where your direction is right. We need to be stronger or we will be worthless - also to the USA.

But we might not agree on Russia and Turkey. I find it extremely important that we think them into our security policy as future partners and even members! Other solutions will be hideous and ugly, not least because of proximity and distance in meters. Russia has past been allies with France and many other

The atomic deterrence is here. It must never be left out of the equation. This is also why the war has gone from warm to cold to economic. Or it was economic all the time. Anyhow - we need to grow economically. It is the exact oppesite of sustainability, if done wrong. But lets assume that we can grow and be environmental sustainably - only this way - the economic way - can we show the world that civilization will prevail.