Event report

On behalf of LINKS Europe and the City of The Hague, the moderator of the event, William Murray, welcomed participants and introduced the topic: Hard versus Soft Power: Is it time for an EU army? The conversation kicked off with a panel discussion with the participation of Professor Rob de Wijk, Founder, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), The Hague; Dick Zandee, Head of the Security Unit and Senior Research Fellow, The Clingendael Institute, The Hague; and Dr Daniel S. Hamilton, Senior Non-Resident Fellow, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs at the US Department of State. Other participants commented or asked questions during the course of the conversation. . The short answer to the question “Is it time for a European army?” is no. This was the unanimous view among speakers and participants in the roundtable discussion. Even though an EU army may be needed, none of the prerequisites exist. Equally unanimous was the view that there needs to be stronger European defence co-operation, co-ordination and commitment in the face of ever- increasing threats and of changes in the US defence posture. Participants recognised the need for a sense of urgency in the conduct of this debate on European defence. In many ways there was no time to lose. There was a broadly positive assessment of the “Strategic Compass” recently published by the European External Action Service. Unlike previous efforts in this direction, it combines ambition and realism; has clearly defined and time-tabled action points; and focuses on current and future challenges. The discussion gave particular attention to the question of Europe’s reliance on the US for its defence. The broad consensus was that dependence on the US was real and across the board and unlikely to end in the short term. On the other hand, excessive dependence was no longer sustainable. Concerns were aired that the EU’s decision-making process was too much driven by crisis. Even though not immediately under consideration, the issue of nuclear capability will need to be discussed if ever the issue of strategic autonomy develops enough. In its quest to become a security provider, the EU needs to consider what niche areas it can excel in, and focus on them. Cyber defence can be one. Whilst there were many different opinions aired during the meeting, and differences on some of the approaches going forward, it was still possible to draw some conclusions and recommendations: (a) In the face of fast changing international developments and serious challenges to the safety and security of Europe’s citizens, the debate on the future of European defence needs to be widened and accelerated. Even though immediate action is necessary, there is a need to ensure that citizens are aware of the threats and that a broad consensus emerges about the response. (b) In future thinking on European defence, EU-NATO relations are pivotal. NATO has to be “Europeanised”, to the extent that its European member states would provide half of the necessary troops and enablers. In the long term and after that happens, “European NATO” could merge in the EU. (c) Europe needs to have the capacity to operate in the neighbourhood without the US, even if only as first responders. (d) The EU’s recently published Strategic Compass is a positive development, but the real test starts when it moves from the design stage in Brussels to the implementation stage in the various European capitals in March 2022. The military elites of the member states need to be prepared for the big demands that are going to be made on them and to take ownership of the process. (e) “What is Europe?” – The answer continues to be defined and redefined. The cumbersome decision- making process within the EU made defence co- operation more challenging. Different countries have different threat perceptions. There are huge risks in endless navel gazing. The option for “coalitions of the willing” therefore needs to remain. (f) The EU has allocated substantial amounts of money for the development of European defence capabilities. These are, however, mainly targeted at long-term initiatives. There is, however, an urgent need to develop capabilities to respond to immediate needs, including in the area of hybrid warfare. It is necessary for the EU to get the basics right before it runs out of time. This may require a re-organisation of PESCO, the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence, through which 25 Member States committed to co-operate more closely with one another on defence. (g) In the current situation on the European continent, NATO’s expansion to the East is unlikely, even as NATO and the West continue to insist on the right of Georgia and Ukraine to join if they want to. This requires that the partnership with these and other countries be extended to the maximum short of full membership. (h) In the face of hybrid threats, the EU needs to be able to deploy a mix of hard and soft power. Here too it needs to up its ambition to become a “Soft power superpower” but this will require a better understanding on how soft power can be used strategically. The possibility of designating one of the EU Commissioners to be responsible for mobilising and co-ordinating European soft powers tools and capabilities should be considered. (i) The fragmentation in European defence is costly and risky. All processes that lead to better co-ordination and integration, interoperability, and joint processes in procurement and research should be encouraged. Co- ordinating, supporting and financing these processes can be an important role that the EU as an institution can play in the field of European defence. (j) Regardless of its operational limitations, the European Union has a central role to play to co-ordinate and develop European defence and security policy, including through co-ordinated approaches within the UN and the OSCE and in negotiations on the future of Europe’s security and security architecture.